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Cornhusker Economics
The Ethanol Renewable Identiﬁcation Number Price Fight
and Nebraska Agriculture
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market

Year
Ago

120.00

4 Wks
Ago

*

4-6-18

115.00

174.81

185.34

183.16

142.76

153.15

146.31

209.99

223.63

217.41

57.94

60.50

46.26

74.69

74.23

67.76

154.36

138.15

145.73

342.41

NA

373.73

2.93

4.43

4.57

3.33

3.59

3.65

8.51

9.45

9.65

5.27

5.91

5.91

2.85

2.92

2.74

*

150.00

*

65.00

97.50

97.50

67.50

*

*

103.75

151.00

160.00

42.50

51.00

51.50

The petroleum industry has launched a fierce political fight against the Renewable Fuel Standard
(RFS), the regulations that require renewable
fuels such as ethanol to be blended into the motor fuel supply. The industry complains that
meeting those requirements has become too expensive. President Trump has been presiding
over frequent White House meetings1 to address
the issue, with corn-state senators leading corn/
ethanol constituents in confrontation with Texas
senators leading the petroleum refiners.
Contrary to claims from both sides, capping Renewable Identification Number (RIN) prices as
proposed by petroleum interests would have little
impact on the industry. The real threat is reduction of the blending mandates to levels below
those stipulated in the 2007 legislation (which the
EPA has apparently been achieving by granting
waivers for small refineries). What follows is an
explanation.
What's an ethanol RIN?
A RIN, is a certificate of origin from an ethanol
manufacturer that corresponds to the production
of a particular gallon of ethanol. Fuel blenders
obtain the RIN when they buy the etha________________
1

Examples:
h ps://www.reuters.com/ar cle/us‐usa‐
biofuels‐trump/trump‐pushes‐big‐corn‐and‐big‐oil‐to‐
break‐biofuels‐deadlock‐idUSKCN1GD3VF ;
h ps://www.reuters.com/ar cle/us‐usa‐biofuels‐trump/
senators‐ask‐trump‐to‐suspend‐epas‐use‐of‐biofuel‐
waivers‐idUSKBN1HG2SG
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nol. They turn in the RINs to the EPA to prove that
they have complied with their Renewable Volume Obligation (RVO) under the 2007 Energy Independence
and Security Act (EISA). These regulations comprise
what is known as the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS).
Why does a RIN have a price?
Because they are tradeable. The whole point of the RFS
was to require more fuel ethanol to be burned than
would result from the market without the intervention. To achieve this extra consumption, buyers' price
must be lowered to convince buyers to buy more. At
the same time, the ethanol producers' price must be
raised to convince them to produce more. This is a bitter pill for the blenders caught in the middle, who now
have the obligation to buy high and sell low (obtain a
low value in the ethanol-gasoline blend) to achieve the
higher volume requirement.
If RINs were not tradeable, each blender would just
have to blend its own RVO, and there would be no
such thing as a price for RINs. But tradability allows
some blenders to avoid the blending process by purchasing RINs (with no ethanol attached) from a blender who has blended more than its own RVO (an E-85
blender, for example).
Blenders can't escape the pain.
Blenders can either buy ethanol and blend it, losing
money on every gallon, or buy just a RIN, but the hurt
to the blender is about the same either way – the loss
on each gallon blended is about the same as the price
he must pay for the RIN. The ethanol RIN price is currently about $0.38 per gallon of RIN, a reflection of the
price wedge between what the blender must pay to
ethanol plants (around $1.35 per gallon currently in
Nebraska) and the value of the ethanol in the gasoline
blend. It's the cost (at the margin) imposed by the
RVO.
Why don't the blenders go broke doing this?
The reason blenders don't go broke buying high and
selling low is that they can pass the loss along to the
motorist. They charge a high enough price for the
blended gasoline (E10, etc.) to pay for the gasoline
component and also make up the loss on the ethanol
component. The petroleum industry quite rightly
points to the cost of RINs as the cost of meeting the
RVO, even though they do recoup that cost in the
price they charge for blended gasoline.

Didn't Philadelphia Energy Solutions (PES) recently go bankrupt because of this?
The petroleum industry would like us to think so,
because this would enhance their arguments for
scrapping or undermining the RFS. PES had been
meeting its RVO by purchasing RINs rather than
buying and blending ethanol, paying $217 million
for RINs just in 2017. But as noted above, the cost
of buying the required ethanol high and selling it
low would have resulted in blending losses of a
similar size. This cost is an obstacle that all blenders have had to overcome. There is clearly something more involved in the PES bankruptcy, because we have not seen widespread bankruptcies in
petroleum merchandising.
What would happen if the price of ethanol RINs
were to be capped?
The answer is pretty simple: Not much! True, the
volume of RINs traded would shrink. But even if
the traded RIN volume went to zero, each blender
would still be required to meet their RVO, internalizing the cost of buying high and selling low as
described above. The total blending cost to the industry would be somewhat higher, because highcost blenders would have to blend and suffer that
cost, rather than buy RINs from lower-cost blenders. Tradability increases blending industry efficiency.
Capping the RIN price would reduce these efficiency gains, but the ethanol volume would not
change because the RVO sets that amount, and
therefore the price of ethanol would not change
significantly, if at all.
What would happen to Nebraska if ethanol RINs
were to be capped?
No significant impact on volume of ethanol means
no significant change in the volume of corn and
thus no impact on either industry in Nebraska.
Caveat: The renewable fuels market is more complicated than described above.
RVOs are specified on an annual basis, yet RINs
can be carried over from one year to the next, creating a dynamic RIN price component not considered above.

There are several nested categories of renewable fuels,
and the above doesn't distinguish them or explain their
interactions. For example, the "blend wall" implies that
only at a very low price will motorists be convinced to
buy blends with more ethanol than E10, and there are
very few pumps to provide such blends. So biodiesel
RINs are being used to satisfy RVOs for the ethanol
category (any "renewable fuel").
These and other idiosyncrasies of the RFS make it difficult to explain and analyze the renewable fuels markets
precisely and completely, but none of them lead to a
contradiction of the logic explained above regarding a
cap on the price of RINs.
Don't be fooled: It's the RVO that matters.
A recent industry report2 asserts that the EPA has recently granted 25 small-refinery waivers, which given
the relevant definition of "small", must total over 1 billion gallons. This implies a reduction of at least 7% in
the 2018 RVO, which is a significant impact on the industry, and RIN prices dropped substantially in response.

__________________
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